# NETTEN: who can sign for the wallets that paid NETTEN

**Signed verification record.** Wording reviewed by NETTEN on 22 October 2026.

| | |
|---|---|
| Record | KVT-REC-2026-NETTEN-01 |
| Issued by | Kairo Vault Technologies G.K. (Tokyo), independent of NETTEN |
| Subject | NETTEN (nettenapp), non-custodial RLUSD / XRP payments on the XRP Ledger |
| Statement checked | "NETTEN never signs for a merchant." |
| Ledger | XRP Ledger mainnet, validated ledger **107713543**, closed **2026-10-17 08:29:51 UTC** |
| Ledger hash | `0D47D33833D9642C3EB7049CB89B6D5AABC1934C78C3AAE64B1FC1ABCA88BE78` |
| Read on | xrplcluster.com and Ripple's s1, two independent servers. Same hash and same results on both. |
| Fee | None. NETTEN agreed to be named. |

## Result

**At ledger 107713543, none of the six outside accounts that had paid NETTEN's fee account could be signed for by any NETTEN account.** Each one could only be signed with its own master key: no regular key, no signer list, no delegated permissions. NETTEN's own five accounts also used only their own master keys and had given no delegated permissions.

## What was checked

**NETTEN's accounts.** NETTEN supplied this list on 17 October 2026:

| Name (NETTEN's) | Account | Master key | Regular key | Signer list | Delegates given |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Platform/Rewards | rDQzhMQbsNn6yefNMTj34rMHnHokYV6otH | enabled | none | none | none |
| Fee Collection | rLHet8tyiokdM65HEcU4fF32pgzPngoJek | enabled | none | none | none |
| Subscription | rG4NUbWKhNiuuD7wfdZQ4n29sxmSCH7Sdy | enabled | none | none | none |
| NETTEN TREASURY | rasQbdfaTXGy7SUMbDQY7qpPwe8JMdwc5h | enabled | none | none | none |
| NETTEN | rnRiHKeqcPtfaZYidxrMFd4Truz7SgYFBh | enabled | none | none | none |

**Everyone who had paid the fee account.** Up to ledger 107713543 the fee account received 7 successful payments: 1 from NETTEN's own account (0.3 RLUSD) and 6 from outside accounts.

| Outside account | Paid | Master key | Regular key | Signer list | Delegates given | Controlled by NETTEN? |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| rUrYCcn3UkgC2ZXDWDvWT1D8VmM2X5Yiws | 22 XRP | enabled | none | none | none | no |
| raFza6VZopgeHyqzfzwJAUkFhNCJx2S84y | 4.5 RLUSD | enabled | none | none | none | no |
| rKEVwSRszYF6mG2K28nD2xzZeQRCFU3jf2 | 0.5 RLUSD | enabled | none | none | none | no |
| rUbt82cnFDjcet7MybRZ9NhN1istJ3qYbm | 0.000001 XRP | enabled | none | none | none | no |
| r428GGG2F1vgn9BUtuiCiEmzrh5oAnhyj7 | 0.000010201 RLUSD | enabled | none | none | none | no |
| rLG4hMNfeYBtDsEK1acWcxRw6Jbu2Gg2A8 | 0.000003 XRP | enabled | none | none | none | no |

Three of the six sent only tiny amounts (under 0.00002). That pattern usually means unsolicited "dust" sent by third parties, not merchant payments. This record does not say which accounts are NETTEN merchants; it covers every account that paid, as agreed with NETTEN.

## What this record does not cover

- Only on-ledger signing authority (master key, regular key, signer list, delegated permissions) at one ledger. A later change needs a new reading.
- Only the accounts listed above. NETTEN users who never paid the fee account on-ledger are not covered.
- Nothing off the ledger: how keys are created or stored, NETTEN's servers, its app code.
- **Reported by NETTEN, not examined here:** Merchants who create a wallet in the NETTEN web app have an encrypted backup of their wallet key stored by NETTEN. Opening it needs the merchant's passkey, or their recovery code after an emailed confirmation and a 24-hour hold, plus a second secret NETTEN keeps in AWS KMS. NETTEN cannot decrypt it alone. Wallets made in the NETTEN mobile app keep their key only on the phone. This record did not examine either design.
- It is not an audit, a certification or a security review, and it gives no opinion on NETTEN's business.

## Re-check it yourself

Anyone can repeat this reading from public servers, with no account and no keys:

```
python3 recheck.py --ledger 107713543
```

`recheck.py` (Python 3.8+, standard library only) sha256 `0b9ae9d98158b6058d83e511c5655b616019471648fef3097d3875228aef5e7a`. It reads the same ledger on both servers, lists every payment to the fee account, reads each account's master key, regular key, signer list and delegates, and prints `servers_agree` and the result. KVT's own run produced `result_107713543.json`, sha256 `56ca6a84e521985cf57e98cbf4a4b4c8a2ddd985dc796affb2b6614306cdbbc6`.

## Signature

Signed by Kairo Vault Technologies G.K. with its record key (Ed25519, public key `bd56ae14db5571a70b41e21abb5a1df3e325ab7ce380f2b28548020023c2ed22`). The signed message is the line `KVT-REC-2026-NETTEN-01/v1` followed by a newline and the exact bytes of this file. The 64-byte signature is published next to it as `NETTEN_Record_KVT-REC-2026-NETTEN-01.sig`, with the file's sha256.